This paper presents a model in which agents are distinguished by their characteristics, exchange of goods requires communication between firms and their customers, and agents with similar characteristics communicate more effectively. This setup delivers a body of testable implications about the matching of workers to jobs, the associated wages and product prices, and the manner in which job assignments, wages and prices respond to changes in the parameters of the economy.
Introduction
The twentieth century has witnessed many advances in technology and accompanying growth in the human and physical capital stocks. These developments have been the subject of a great deal of research. However, the economic impact of demographic change, viewed as part of the evolution of the human capital stock, has been little explored.
That there has been much demographic change in the workforce needs little documentation. In fact, it is difficult to point to a demographic dimension along which the workforce has not changed significantly since the second world war. To sociologists and anthropologists this is of obvious interest. And much of the popular interest in "diversity" can be thought of as an outgrowth of these changes. But is demographic change of economic significance in the sense of representing a quantitatively important change in the economy's productive capacity (endowments or technology), or ability to enjoy what is produced (the home production technology), or an endogenous response to variation in some dimension of the economy's primitives? Some examples: what is the importance of the rising fraction of the workforce that is female, and why has this increase occurred in all industrial economies? A similar question can be asked about the rising fraction of minorities or foreign-born in the labor force, or the trend towards an older workforce. Furthermore, what, if anything, do these changes have to do with other economic phenomena such as the shrinking role of manufacturing, the growth of the service sector, or technological change? While this paper does not address all of these questions, answering any of them requires a theory where demography plays a substantive role in determining prices and quantities.
There are many ways in which personal characteristics might play an economic role. This paper models such characteristics as influencing firms' efficiency in communicating with customers.
1 Specifically, the activities of the firm include the production 1 There are other ways in which communication might enter, e.g., communication between workers within the firm. Plans to extend the model to incorporate within-firm communication in are and delivery/distribution of the firm's products to customers, as usual. However, delivery is assumed to require communication between the firm's representative -the employee -and the customer. A key assumption is that individuals of similar characteristics communicate at lower cost. Given this assumption, efficiency and competition dictate matching employees and customers. Thus, as distinct from related literature, the analysis stresses the role of standard economic incentives in generating matching based on personal characteristics, rather than discrimination/favoritism, traditions, legislative/political initiatives, or bargaining between groups.
Personal characteristics might influence economic activity in ways that do not involve communication. For example, characteristics might be related to tastes: presumably this explains why the delicatessens in New York City are superior and more plentiful per capita in comparison to Minneapolis. However, for purposes of studying the effects of demographic change in the workforce, focusing on the manner in which personal characteristics influence the way individuals interact -particularly, but not exclusively, employees and the firm's customers -both has intuitive appeal and is commonly described as an important aspect of managing human resources.
2
The personal characteristics in the model are abstract. They might correspond to obvious measurable features such as sex, race, age, or ethnicity. But they may equally be interpreted as harder-to-quantify, but observable, characteristics such as "thinks like a Chicago economist", having "experience in common with others," e.g., veteran status, lineage, or parenthood. The key feature emphasized in the model is that whatever personal characteristics are, they matter for the way the firm and its described below. 2 For example: "With globalization, America's highly diverse labor force is an asset that can make the difference between success and failure in competitive markets," Michael Goldstein, Vice
Chairman & CEO, Toys "R" Us, Inc.; "It is time for American business to embrace the ever increasing diversity of its workforce as a resource in the international markets where we now compete.
A ... diverse workforce will make us ... economically stronger," Joseph J. Grano, Jr., President, The model developed to formalize these ideas yields a long list of testable predictions about the equilibrium allocation of workers to production and delivery tasks within sectors of the economy, the associated wages and product prices, and the man-3 For example, Bruce Bean, the head of Coudert Brothers law offices in Moscow, remarks that the cancellation of an agreement between Exxon Corporation and the Russian government "...raises the question of whether a deal is a deal in Russia because Exxon is meticulous to a fault in following the letter of the law." (Wall Street Journal, 8/28/97, page A2.) ner in which allocations, wages and prices respond to changes in exogenous features of the economy -factor endowments, tastes and technology parameters. A fairlyimmediate implication, as an example, is that the prices consumers pay for products will generally vary with their personal characteristics. The argument is simply that delivering the product requires resources whose prices generally depend on personal characteristics. The implications differ from those that would follow from existing job matching models (see Roy (1950) , Rosen (1978) , and the survey by Sattinger (1993)) because the distribution activity causes some types of workers to be employed in firms where comparative advantage in production alone would dictate zero employment for those types. The implications are broadly consistent with Becker's (1957) theory of discrimination. There, consumers' and workers' preferences over the characteristics of those with whom they associate causes these characteristics to influence prices and quantities. This theory is extremely flexible since the structure of preferences is unrestricted. Strictly, the model studied here differs from Becker's in that it is a general equilibrium model; however, it can be re-interpreted as a Becker-style model, and its specific implications cast in that language.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin with some detailed examples in which the primitives of the theory we develop are descriptive. Then, we set out the model, derive its equilibrium, develop a list of testable implications, and discuss the type of data and empirical methods that would be appropriate for testing them.
2 Examples
Coming soon. 4 In an earlier draft we applied the model to provide a unified explanation for common crosscountry features of the temporal behavior of the distribution of men and women in manufacturing and services.
Model
There are two commodities, indexed by i = 1, 2, and two types of agents, indexed by j = a, b. There are N j agents of type j; N j > 0. All agents inelastically supply one unit of labor effort and consume both goods. Agents of type j have preferences
where 0 < γ j < 1 and c i represents consumption of good i.
Production is constant returns to scale, so it can be assumed that there is one large competitive firm in each goods market and profits can be ignored. Firms engage in the production and delivery of goods. Thus any type j agent will either produce q ij ( with similar experiences exchange information and ideas with the least distortion is a simple, workable specification.
The model can be interpreted as a general equilibrium version of Becker's discrimination model. Instead of interpreting the delivery technology as type j being able to communicate only with other type j's, it can be interpreted as type j simply preferring not (at any price, for simplicity) to accept delivery from anyone who is not also of type j. The communication interpretation is adopted in the paper because it is both easily motivated as well as more suggestive of the kind of situations to which the model might or might not apply (i.e., how type might be defined). For example, the communication interpretation indicates that the model should be useful for understanding aspects of employment and relative wages of groups such as Spanish-speakers in the US., or the French in Canada, at least insofar as employment in industries requiring significant interaction with customers or retailers is concerned.
It should be much less usefully applied where the differences among agents do not obviously imply differences in the way products are delivered. For example, with the possible exception of the fashion industry or professional sports, according to the communications interpretation, the model's implications should not apply when type is interpreted as height.
Since individuals can chose between production and delivery jobs, there is no loss in generality in assuming that for a given type, wages do not vary across jobs. Let w j be the wage earned by type j, and let w a ≡ 1. On the other hand, the cost of producing and delivering good i may depend on the type who delivers/consumes it.
This will be reflected in prices with the more costly-to-deliver units commanding a higher price. Let p ij be the price type j pays for a unit of good i. (Note that intertype price differences do not create arbitrage opportunities, since all individuals who are capable of delivering goods to one another face the same prices.)
Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that factor and product markets clear, agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, and the firm maximizes profits.
Factor market clearing requires that
Since aggregate income of type j is w j N j , the usual utility maximization calculus delivers type j's demand functions:
for good 1 and
Since what is demanded by type j must be delivered by type j, market clearing imposes the four conditions
and ∀j,
Firm profits are given by
which is maximized subject to the constraint that, for each i, production must exceed deliveries:
Necessary and sufficient conditions for profit maximization are:
and
Here λ i is the multiplier associated with the constraint (6).
Conditions (1)- (6) 
Results

Form of Equilibrium
As a "base case", assume uniform productive and distributional efficiency across worker types: d ij = d i and q ij = q i . Then, product prices and wages are the same for all agents. Lemma 1 (see the Appendix) demonstrates that uniformity follows because the output of each worker type and the cost of servicing type a and type b customers are the same. The amount of labor devoted to production across the industries in this symmetric economy will reflect agents' tastes, so the aggregate work force producing good i can include a greater fraction of type j than j makes up in the population at large; for example, the fraction of j in production of good 1 is
, whereas the fraction of j in the population is
. However, the ratio of agents in production to those in product delivery is the same for both goods and both types. Altogether, for the fact that there are different types in the economy to have any economically significant effect, at least one of d i1 6 = d i2 and q i1 6 = q i2 must hold.
To proceed, note that the assumption of within-type delivery requires each worker type to deliver both goods in equilibrium: ∀i, ∀j, n d ij > 0; see Lemma 2, in the Appendix. Intuitively, since type j agents consume both products (0 < γ j < 1, ∀j) and can only communicate with similar-type workers, each type must deliver both goods. Also, in general, productivity will display some pattern of comparative advantage:
varies with j. Given comparative advantage in the production of one of the goods, it is profitable to reallocate types (relative to what would occur in the symmetric economy) in the direction of producing only the good at which they have a comparative advantage. It follows that at least one group must produce at most one good (Lemma 3, in the appendix.) In fact, in equilibrium, each group produces some of at least one good (∀j, n q ij > 0 for some j). To see the intuition, suppose type a's only deliver. Since each type a worker can deliver d ia units to consumers other than herself, devoting all labor of type a to distribution generates excess capacity in delivery relative to the demand for good i by type a consumers. Therefore, market clearing in the market for the services of type a workers requires that some perform production jobs (Lemma 4, in the Appendix.)
Together these results imply that in the case of comparative advantage, each type produces at least one, and possibly both goods, but that both types do not simultaneously produce both goods. Both types deliver both goods. Effectively then, there are just two cases of interest, depending on parameter values. In one, one type produces one good and the other produces both; and in the other case, each type produces just one good. The former (see parameter restriction #2, below) applies when endowments of types are "skewed." For brevity, attention will be confined to this instance. 
Then n q 1a = 0 and n q ij > 0 otherwise.
Proof:
Assuming n q 1a = 0 and n q ij > 0, equations (5) imply
Then (4) gives
Goods market clearing then implies
Since type a does not produce good 1, factor market clearing for type a gives
Observe that n
Since only type b produces good 1, production equal to deliveries for good 2 yields
Factor market clearing for type b then gives
The remaining issues are whether parameters are such that n q 2b > 0 and firms do not find it profitable to assign type a to production of good 1. The former is equivalent to the second inequality in the Proposition, and the latter to the first. ¥
Some Features of Equilibrium
The model generates equilibrium values of wages, product prices, and job assignments.
Inter-type Wages As stated earlier, wages do not vary by job. Wages will vary across worker type, however, to reflect the pattern of absolute advantage at the common activity, production of good 2. Since w a = 1 and w b = q 2b q 2a
, whether type a earns more than type b depends on their relative production of good 2.
Inter-type Prices Product prices will vary by consumer type in competitive equilibrium to reflect the total cost of production. From (4) it follows that
That is, by hiring one more type a to deliver good 1, costs per unit delivered rise by
; the analogous cost increase for hiring a type b is
. Since these costs must be offset by revenue per delivered unit, the more costly-to-deliver units must command a higher price.
Job Assignments In equilibrium, the allocation of labor to delivery tasks follows from product market clearing and endogenously-determined wages and prices. Specifically, the requirement that all goods consumed in the economy must be delivered (see 2 and 3) dictates the assignment of individuals to delivery jobs within the economy (n d ib and n d ib ) be based on the efficiency of the deliverer. In the case of type a's, factor market clearing, (1), implies that all type a's not delivering goods engage in the production of good 2, determining n 
Effect of Parameter Changes
Testable implications also follow from changes in exogenous ingredients of the model -tastes, endowments of individuals in the economy, and technologies for production and delivery. Briefly, wages are sensitive only to changes in the relative productivity of workers in the production of good 2; product prices respond to changes in delivery and production costs, and the assignment of workers to jobs is influenced by each of the parameters of the model, though type a individuals are insulated generally from parameter changes involving type b. The details follow, and a summary table appears at the end of this Section.
Tastes γ a Increasing type a's preference for good 1 (γ a ) implies no change in wages since (from (8)) w b is determined by type b's relative productivity. Likewise, since supply is infinitely elastic, product prices are determined by production and delivery costs, so the taste change has no effect on product prices p ij ; see (9)-(12). On the other hand, from (13) and (15), deliveries to type a involve more of good 1 and less of good 2. But since tastes, income and prices for type b are unaffected, so are deliveries of either good; i.e. n d ib is independent of γ a for all i. Altogether, more of good 1 has to be produced and less of good 2. Since only type b produces good 1, clearly n q 1b must rise, and this must be matched by a decrease in n q 2b . Whether n q 2a rises or falls depends on how good b's are at producing good 1 in comparison to how good a's are at delivering it. That is, the increase in n q 1b , and consequent fall in n q 2b , yields more good 1 and less good 2, and thus a change in the pattern of what type a's must deliver. If a's are good at delivery of good 1, some of them may be shifted to producing yet more of good 2. Formally, differentiation of (17) gives
The case just described is one in which
is small in comparison to
γ b Increasing type b's preference for good 1 (γ b ) has effects that are analogous to a change in γ a , but with two exceptions. When γ a increased, since a's do not produce good 1, the allocation of type b's to production of good 1 was affected, and how the distribution of type a's between production and delivery would respond depended on parameter values. In response to a change in γ b , however, b's greater consumption of good 1 is accommodated solely by a reallocation of b's from production and delivery of good 2 towards production and delivery of good 1; i.e. n d 1b and n q 1b both rise and n d 2b and n q 2b both fall. In effect, the type a's are insulated from the parameter change.
Endowments N a An increase in the mass of type a's has no implications for wages or prices.
However, more a's means more delivery to and production by a's (n d ia and n q 2a rise) and a shift out of production of good 2 and towards good 1 by b's, whose consumption is not altered. Again the effect of a parameter change involving type a has ramifications for type b.
N b An increase in the mass of b's simply expands the b's portion of the economy with no effect on the a's at all.
Delivery Technology
d 1a An increase in d 1a means that good 1 can be delivered to a's more cheaply.
While this has no implications for wages, it does lower the equilibrium price of good 1 delivered to a's; all other prices remain unchanged. This price change results in fewer type a's delivering good 1 (although the total delivered rises); i.e. n d 1a falls. Since price changes do not encourage any other changes in the pattern of consumption, the a's released from delivering good 1 go to work producing good 2 (n q 2a increases), and some type b's are shifted from production of good 1 to production of good 2 (n q 1b rises and n q 2b falls). Production Technology q 1b Since relative wages are determined by relative productivity at the shared task, production of good 2, an increase in q 1b has no effect on wages. It does, however, lower the cost of producing good 1, which translates into a fall in p 1j , a corresponding increase in n d 1j , and no change in p 2j . This means that a's must be drawn away from production of good 2 (n q 2a falls), and to maintain p 2b , these workers must be replaced by type b's (n q 2b rises). The reallocation of type b workers is possible because greater q 1b allows n q 1b to fall while total production of good 1 rises. q 2a When q 2a increases, a's are relatively more productive at the shared task, resulting in a decline in the relative wage of b's. Since b's are an input to all production, all prices fall as well. Deliveries to a's rise (n d ia increases), but for b's the fall in wages offsets the price decline, leaving deliveries to them (n d ib ) unaltered. The extra deliveries to a's are accomplished by shifting some a's from production of good 2 (n q 2a falls) to delivery to a's. Since the a's remaining in production are more productive than previously, some b's can also be shifted from producing good 2 to producing good 1 (n q 1b increases and n q 2b falls).
q 2b An increase in q 2b raises the relative wage of b's (recall that w a is the numeraire).
Since good 1 is produced only by b's, good 1 must command a higher price (p 1j increases). But since good 2 is also produced by type a, the price of good 2 must rise only when it is delivered by type b (p 2a remains fixed, p 2b increases). The rise in p 1a leads less good 1 to be delivered to type a (n d 1a falls), while deliveries (n d 2a ) of good 2 do not change. On the other hand, since type both produces and delivers good 1 to itself, the price rise associated with rises w b is large and deliveries of good 1 to type b are not affected by the change in q 2b . But the rise in price for good 2 is smaller and deliveries to type b rise accordingly. Since fewer type a are needed for delivery, they end up producing more good 2 (n q 2a increases). As for type b, since total deliveries of good 1 fall, and only b's produce good 1, fewer must produce good 1 (n q 1b falls). As for type b's producing good 2, it is not clear what happens. Fewer are needed to produce a given output because each is more productive. But output of good 2 must rise. Thus it is not clear whether all of the type b released from production of good 1 end up delivering good 2 to type b, or whether some end up in production of good 2. This seems to depend on parameters in some counterintuitive manner.
Summary of Effects of Parameter Changes
γ a γ b N a N b d 1a d 1b d 2a d 2b q 1b q 2a q 2b w b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − + p 1a 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - + p 1b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - + p 2a 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 p 2b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 - + n d 1a + 0 + 0 - 0 0 0 + + - n d 1b 0 + 0 + 0 - 0 0 + 0 0 n d 2a - 0 + 0 0 0 - 0 0 + 0 n d 2b 0 - 0 + 0 0 0 - 0 0 + n q 2a ± 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 - - + n q 1b + + + + + + 0 0 - + - n q 2b - - - + - 0 0 + + - ±
Future Work
While the research described in this paper provides interesting insights into the role of demography in the activities of firms, the model remains a first step. There are two avenues which particularly merit further investigation. First, the existing version of the theory suppresses within-firm communication issues. As a first approximation, this restriction can be motivated by noting that in many cases employees interact more with one another than they do with customers, so that learning to communicate with colleagues pays. In this sense it is often the customer interface that is the more problematic and interesting subject. Nevertheless, allowing for internal communication issues will integrate the work of other social scientists on workforce diversity into the theory and be a source of a whole list of additional testable implications.
Second, the model assumes that personal characteristics are endowed and cannot be acquired. In this sense the model is "short run." While this is a useful simplification, and sometimes descriptively accurate, investigation of the manner in which personal characteristics evolve in response to economic incentives may deliver an interesting additional of hypotheses.
Summary
There is little debate that the complexion of the workforce has changed over the last fifty years. This paper is an attempt to improve understanding of the economic significance of agent heterogeneity for firms. The model is a two-sector, general equilibrium economy in which efficiency dictates the allocation of workers to production and delivery tasks across sectors. The novel aspect of the model is that it assumes personal characteristics influence the costs of product delivery -communication across agent types less effective that communication among similar-type agents. This framework yields predictions about job allocations by agent type and comparative static predictions. .
Proof:
Assume the economy can be decomposed into two separate economies, by type, and let w j = 1; note that in economy j, n The fourth group of equations gives
Using this in the condition determining n d ij gives #1. Substitution in the market clearing conditions yield #3. Then treating the last conditions as equalities gives #4. (Note that the factor market clearing condition is exactly satisfied when this is done.) Finally, the assumptions w j = 1 and that the economy can be decomposed are consistent with this algebra.¥ Lemma 2 Each type delivers both goods (∀i, ∀j, n d ij > 0).
First suppose that n d ij = 0 for some i and j. Then one of (2) or (3) implies
and (5) implies
It follows that This implies that (1) is violated for j = a.¥
